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This article compares an ACE system with a CBIT system in an open economy. Using a real-
option approach we show that, if a firm can decide when to invest, a tradeoff is found. 
According to traditional wisdom, a high-income firm investing in an ACE system faces a 
heavier tax burden at each instant. On the other hand, it finds it optimal to invest earlier, 
thereby enjoying a longer stream of income. If, given the same tax burden, the latter effect is 
great enough, the firm will prefer the ACE system. In this article we also run a simulation 
which shows that preference for an ACE system is a realistic result. 
JEL Code: H25, H32. 
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In the early 90s, two opposing and fairly innovative corporation tax systems
were proposed: the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) and the Com-
prehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT). The implementation of the ACE
was advocated by the IFS Capital Taxes Group (1991). Under this system,
the tax base is equal to the ￿rm￿ s current earnings, net of the opportunity
cost of ￿nance. The CBIT was proposed by the US Treasury Department
(1992). It extends the tax base for business, by disallowing interest payments
deductibility from the pro￿t tax base. all kinds of capital income are thus
taxed at the ￿rm level.
The above systems have di⁄erent real e⁄ects. As argued by Bond (2000),
in a closed economy the ACE tax reduces the user cost of capital under
equity-￿nancing, while leaving unchanged the tax treatment of debt. This
makes the ACE preferable to the CBIT. In a small open economy, instead,
the CBIT may be preferred. Since the CBIT system has a wider tax base, it
requires a lower tax rate to raise a given amount of revenues. Hence, mobile
multinational companies, who usually earn rents, face a less heavy tax burden
under such a system.
The above argument against the ACE system disregards two important
features of FDIs: their intrinsic riskiness and the ability of ￿rms to choose
when to invest. As pointed out by Heckman (2003), the world economy is
more variable than it was 30 years ago1. Not only business projects are riskier,
but also they represent opportunities rather than obligations. Thus, ￿rms
behave as if they owned option-rights on business projects. This entails that
￿rms can usually decide when to invest, thereby enjoying a certain degree
of ￿ exibility2. The value of ￿ exibility can be computed using option pricing
techniques3.
Using a real-option approach, this article shows that riskiness and busi-
1The increase in variability is due to increased international mobility of factors and
goods; the deregulation of national capital controls and creation of new ￿nancial markets;
the entry of new countries in international trade, international outsourcing of production
on a large scale and, ￿nally, the formidable rise in the use of skill-biased technology.
2McDonald and Siegel (1986) show that the opportunity to postpone investment is
analogous to a call option.
3Graham and Harvey (2001) ￿nd that about 25% of the US companies surveyed al-
ways or almost always incorporate real options when evaluating a project. Furhermore,
McDonald (2000) argues that even when ￿rms apply standard techniques, it is possible
that they adopt ad hoc rules of thumb which proxy for optimal timing behaviour.
2ness timing are crucial determinants of FDI strategies in an open economy.
According to traditional wisdom, a high-income ￿rm investing in an ACE
system faces a heavier tax burden at each instant. On the other hand, the
￿rm may ￿nd it optimal to invest earlier under an ACE system, and thus
it enjoys a longer stream of income. If, therefore, this latter e⁄ect is great
enough, the ￿rm will prefer the ACE system even in an open economy.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a continuous-time
model and computes the e⁄ects of taxation on ￿rms￿investment strategies.
Section 3 compares the ACE and CBIT system and provides some numerical
simulations. Finally, section 4 summarizes the results and discusses some
topics for further research.
2 The model
In this section we introduce a continuous-time model describing the behavior
of a representative ￿rm who decides when to invest. The following hypotheses
hold:
1. risk is fully diversi￿able and the risk-free interest rate r is given;
2. current income follows a geometric Brownian motion
dY (t) = ￿Y (t)dz; with Y (0) = Y;
where ￿ is the variance parameter and z is a Wiener process4;
3. the ￿rm starts to earn the payo⁄once a non-depreciable sunk cost, say
F, has been paid5;
4. for simplicity the investment project is fully equity ￿nanced6.
4More precisely, the dynamics of Y (t) should be written as dY (t) = (r ￿ ￿)Y (t)dt +
￿Y (t)dz where ￿ ￿ 0 is the net ￿dividend￿ yield, paid out by the ￿rm, and (r ￿ ￿)
measures the risk-adjusted rate of return (see McDonald and Siegel, 1985). For simplicity,
we thus assume that r ￿ ￿ = 0: As shown in a companion paper (Panteghini, 2002), if
r ￿ ￿ 6= 0, the relevant discount rate would be ￿ and the quality of results would be
unchanged. For further details see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Ch. 5 and 6).
5As shown in Panteghini (2002), the introduction of depreciation would not a⁄ect the
qualitative nature of results.
6Notice that both the ACE and the CBIT system are expected to be neutral in terms
of ￿nancial decisions. Thus the qualitive nature of results does not change if we rule out
debt-￿nancing. For details on neutrality conditions under ACE taxation, see Bond and
Devereux (2003).
3Let us next introduce taxation. In line with Boadway and Bruce (1984),
the tax base of system i is given by the ￿rm￿ s current income, net of an
imputation rate ￿i. Given the tax rate ￿i; current tax payments are thus
equal to
Ti(t) = ￿i [Y (t) ￿ ￿iF]: (1)
The above notation allows a comparison between di⁄erent tax systems. If
we set ￿ACE = r and ￿CBIT = 0; we obtain an ACE and a CBIT system,
respectively. Given (1), the post-tax income can be written as
Y
T
i (t) = (1 ￿ ￿i)Y (t) + ￿i￿iF: (2)
Let us next de￿ne V T
i (Y ) as the ￿rm￿ s after-tax project value under sys-
tem i. In this article personal taxation will be disregarded. This can be
justi￿ed by the fact that in many countries there exist tax-exempt entit-
ies (such as pension funds). Hence, investors have the opportunity to choose
between taxable FDI projects and a tax-exempt ￿nancial investment yielding
r: For this reason, r will be the relevant discount rate under both the CBIT
and the ACE system. Thus the ￿rm￿ s investment decision is one of choosing












where E f:g denotes the expectation operator7. The solution of problem
(3), de￿ned as t￿
i; is the optimal time of investment. If, therefore, t ￿ t￿
i
immediate investment is undertaken. If, instead, t < t￿
i; the ￿rm will wait
until t = t￿
i: It is worth noting that t￿
i may di⁄er from the laissez-faire optimal
timing. In this case, taxation distorts investment timing.
The optimal investment time t￿
i can be associated with an income level
Y ￿
i . This entails that whenever the current income reaches Y ￿
i , the ￿rm
invests. Omitting for simplicity the time variable, we can thus rewrite the






























, is the present value of 1 Euro contingent on
future investment and measures the expected discount factor. As can be
7For further details see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Ch.6).







depends on both current income, Y , and the ￿rm￿ s optimal
trigger point Y ￿
i . The exponent ￿1 > 1 is a constant which depends on the
interest rate and volatility9. The second term of (4) measures a perpetual
rent, given the starting income Y ￿
i .










e Y ; (5)
where e Y ￿
￿1
￿1￿1rF > rF is the laissez-faire trigger point. Given (5), we can
get the economic intuition behind ￿1. As explained by Dixit and Pindyck
(1994, Ch. 5 and 6), the term
￿1
￿1￿1 is the ￿ option value multiple￿ , which
accounts for the additional return required to compensate for investment
option exercise. Since
￿1
￿1￿1 > 1; inequality
e Y
F > r holds. According to the





would be considered as a rent.






income required to cover the option value. This point, per se, partially
explains why ￿rms facing sunk costs may look as high-income companies
when they operate in a stochastic context. These ￿rms not only face sunk
costs but also lose business ￿ exibility when investment is undertaken10. As
they give up the opportunity to see how uncertainty is resolved, they must
account for an additional opportunity cost, which is equal to the option
exercised.
Let us next discuss the e⁄ects of taxation. Given (5), we can argue that
immediate investment is undertaken if Y > Y ￿
i . If, instead, Y < Y ￿
i ; the ￿rm
will wait until Y reaches Y ￿
i : Notice that, under an ACE system, we have
￿ACE = r and, hence, Y ￿
ACE = e Y . This equality implies that the tax system
is neutral, since the ￿rm￿ s investment timing is una⁄ected by taxation11.
Under a CBIT system, instead, we have ￿CBIT = 0. In the absence of




1￿￿CBIT > e Y : Such an inequality entails that the CBIT induces an
9See the Appendix.
10As explained by Pindyck (2004), the real-option approach accounts for the basic fact
that sunk costs a⁄ect investment decision-making when they are not yet sunk.
11This neutrality result is equivalent to that obtained in neoclassical model where the
￿rm￿ s user cost is una⁄ected by taxation.
5investment postponement12.
Under endogenous timing we face two o⁄setting e⁄ects. On the one hand,
the CBIT system is characterised by a wider tax base. Thus it requires a
lower tax rate in order to raise a given amount of revenues. At any instant,
therefore, high-income ￿rms face a less heavy tax burden under the CBIT
system. On the other hand, the inequality Y ￿
ACE = e Y < Y ￿
CBIT implies that
companies investing in the ACE country earn pro￿ts earlier thereby enjoying
a longer stream of pro￿ts.
Let us next compute the ￿rm￿ s project value. If Y > Y ￿
i the ￿rm invests




i (Y ) ￿ F
￿
. If, instead, Y < Y ￿
i ; the ￿rm waits and timing must











































Similarly, we can compute the ￿rm￿ s tax burden13. If Y < Y ￿
i , the ￿rm
postpones investment and, therefore, the expected present value of tax pay-
ments, de￿ned as Ri (Y ); depends on both the current level of Y and Y ￿
i . If
Y > Y ￿
i ; instead, investment is immediate and only Y matters. As shown in
the Appendix we obtain



























Functions (6) and (7) will be used to compare the ACE and the CBIT system.
3 Tax preferences
Given the above results, we can now analyse the tax preferences of a repres-
entative ￿rm in an open economy.
12This result is equivalent to that obtained with a neoclassical model, where a CBIT is
shown to raise the user cost of capital.
13For further details on e⁄ective taxation see Panteghini (2003).
6Assume that there exist two countries. The ￿rst country applies an ACE
system (i.e. ￿ACE = r) with a tax rate ￿ACE: The second country implements
a CBIT system (i.e. ￿CBIT = 0) with a tax rate ￿CBIT: The representative
￿rm must decide in which country to invest.
Given the above assumptions it straightforward to prove the following:
Proposition 1 For any given tax burden, i.e. for
RACE (Y ) = RCBIT (Y ) 8Y > 0; (8)
the ￿rm will prefer the ACE country if Y < Y ￿
CBIT. Otherwise, the ￿rm will
be indi⁄erent.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that a CBIT is never preferred to an ACE system
for any given tax burden. As pointed out in the previous section, a ￿rm
investing in the ACE country starts to earn pro￿ts earlier, thereby enjoying
a longer stream of income. Thus the timing e⁄ect makes the ACE preferable
for Y < Y ￿
CBIT:
Proposition 1 is a preliminary result but does not respond to the main
argument against the ACE system. If governments set tax rates in line with
normal returns, the CBIT might be preferred by ￿rms earning extra-pro￿ts.
To stress the importance of the timing e⁄ect even for high-income ￿rms we
de￿ne e Y as the normal income and analyse the impact of both systems on
high-income ￿rms. Let us then introduce the following:
￿ Assumption 1: The CBIT country sets ￿CBIT, and, in turn, the ACE










According to Assumption 1, the ACE and the CBIT country consider
the laissez-faire trigger point e Y as the normal return and set tax rates in
order to collect the same tax revenues. Given Proposition 1, the ￿ normal￿
￿rm chooses the ACE country and invests immediately. However, the focus
of our analysis is not on normal returns but rather on FDI decisions yielding
an above-normal pro￿tability: For this reason, we will analyse the investment
decisions by ￿rms whose current income is Y > Y ￿
CBIT: According to tradi-
tional wisdom, these ￿rms would choose a CBIT country. As will be shown
the converse may be true. In fact, it is straightforward to prove that:
7Proposition 2 Given Assumption 1, a high-income ￿rm with Y > Y ￿
CBIT
will prefer the ACE system if





; with b Y ￿
￿1(1￿￿CBIT)￿1￿1
￿1(1￿￿CBIT)￿1￿1￿1rF,
ii) or ￿CBIT is high enough.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 highlights the importance of timing to determine tax pref-
erences even for high-income ￿rms. In line with the traditional results it is
shown that the CBIT system may be preferred if both ￿CBIT is low enough
and the ￿rm￿ s income is high enough. However, we prove that even if there
exists a threshold value b Y above which the CBIT is preferred (point i) of
Proposition 2), this is much higher than usually thought.
To give a feeling of the di⁄erential
￿
b Y ￿ e Y
￿
, we run a simulation and
compare the results with Fama and French￿ s (1997) estimates of 48 US in-
dustries, over the 1963-1994 period (see See Table 7, pp. 172-173). In line
with empirical evidence14, we set r = 0:04 and ￿ = 0:2015. Given these
parameters, it is straightforward to show that if ￿CBIT < 50%; then point i)
of Proposition 2 will be applied.
Let us next analyse two scenarios. In the ￿rst one, we set ￿CBIT = 31%;
which is the rate suggested in 1992 by the US Treasury16. In this case, the
ACE tax rate ensuring equality (9) will then be ￿￿
ACE = 42:78%: In the
second scenario, we account for some tax competition pressure, registered
over the last decade, and set ￿CBIT = 25%. In this case, the ACE tax rate
yielding (9) will be ￿￿
ACE = 37:50%: We can thus compute the ￿rm￿ s returns
exceeding the risk-free interest rate.
As shown in Table 1, if the net return is 4% then investment is immedi-
ately undertaken under the ACE system. If the CBIT system is considered,
instead, threshold returns are higher (i.e. 7:59% and 6:67%, respectively).
The last row of Table 1 ￿nally reports the threshold values above which the
14See e.g. Jorion and Goetzman (1999) and Dimson et al. (2002).
15Notice that the parameter values used in our simulation coincide with the benchmark
assumptions in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 153).
16See the US Department of the Treasury (1992).
8CBIT country is preferred. As can be seen, they are fairly high.
Table 1 : A numerical simulation (values in %)




F ￿ r 4:00 4:00
Y ￿
CBIT
F ￿ r 7:59 6:67
b Y
F ￿ r 10:52 8:00
Let us then compare the above results with Fama and French￿ s estimates.
Under a three-factor model, if ￿CBIT = 31%, only real estates among the 48






(i.e. 11.16% versus 10.52%). When we set ￿CBIT = 25%,





. If, ￿nally, a






of the value of ￿CBIT applied. We can thus conclude that, in most cases, an
ACE system would be preferred.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have compared an ACE and a CBIT system in an open
economy. As we know, the CBIT may require a lower statutory tax rate to
gather the same amount of tax revenues. According to traditional wisdom,
therefore, mobile multinational companies, who usually earn rents, would
prefer the CBIT system.
As we have pointed out, the above argument disregards two important
features of FDIs: their intrinsic riskiness and the ability of ￿rms to choose
when to invest. When introducing both assumptions, we have two o⁄setting
e⁄ects. On the one hand, a ￿rm investing in an ACE system faces a heavier
tax burden at each instant. On the other hand, the ￿rm starts to earn pro￿ts
earlier, thereby enjoying a longer stream of pro￿ts. If the latter e⁄ect is great
enough, the ACE system is preferred even in an open economy.
This article should be considered as the starting point for future research.
In particular, a natural extension of the model would be the introduction of
tax competition between the ACE and the CBIT country. Another interest-
9ing topic would be the analysis of how tax avoidance strategies di⁄er among
the two systems.
5 Appendix
5.1 The computation of the objective function (4)
Let us write the Bellman function of V T
i (Y ) as
V
T
i (Y ) = Y
T





i (Y + dY )
￿
. (10)
Assume that the boundary condition V (0) = 0 holds. This implies that if
Y goes to zero, it will stay at zero17. Moreover, assume that if Y goes to
in￿nity, no ￿nancial bubbles exist: Given the above boundary conditions, we
obtain the solution of (10)
V
T







Notice that a Brownian motion satis￿es the Markov property. Namely,
the probability of distribution for all future values of Y depends only on its
current value. Applying this Property and using the trigger point Y ￿
i , one



















i ) ￿ F
￿
: (12)


















for Y < Y
￿
i ; (13)
where ￿1 > 1 is the positive root of the characteristic equation ￿(￿) ￿
￿2
2 ￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ r = 0: Using (11), (12) and (13) one obtains (4).
5.2 The computation of (7)













17For further details on this absorbing barrier see Harrison (1985, Ch. 3).
10Easy computations show that, if t < t￿













If, instead, t > t￿







Using (13), (15) and (16) we thus obtain (7).
5.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Given inequality Y ￿
ACE = e Y < Y ￿
CBIT, we have three cases:
1. Y < Y ￿
ACE < Y ￿
CBIT;
2. Y ￿
ACE < Y < Y ￿
CBIT;
3. Y ￿
ACE < Y ￿
CBIT < Y:
We will analyse the above cases under condition (8).
Case 1: If Y < Y ￿
ACE; under both regimes the ￿rm will postpone invest-
ment. In this case, the ACE system is preferred to the CBIT one if the ACE
pre-tax net present value is greater than the CBIT one. Given (6), (7) and























Inequality (17) can be rewritten as
g (￿CBIT;￿1) > 1






: Notice that g (0;￿1) =
1 and that
@g(￿CBIT;￿1)
@￿CBIT > 0: This is su¢ cient to prove that g (￿CBIT;￿1) > 1
8￿CBIT > 0. Accordingly, (17) always holds 8￿CBIT > 0:
11Case 2: If Y 2 (Y ￿
ACE;Y ￿
CBIT); investment is immediately undertaken in
the ACE country, while it is postponed in the CBIT one. Given (8), the


















Inequality (18) can be rewritten as f (Y ) > f (Y ￿
CBIT); where f (Y ) ￿
Y ￿rF









@Y < 0: This is su¢ cient to state that inequality
f (Y ) > f (Y ￿
CBIT) holds for Y 2 (Y ￿
ACE;Y ￿
CBIT): Hence, (18) always holds.
Case 3: If, ￿nally, Y > Y ￿
CBIT; the ￿rm will immediately invest irrespective




, under both systems. This leads to indi⁄erence.
Proposition 1 is thus proven.￿
5.4 Proof of Proposition 2
According to Assumption 1, the ACE country sets ￿ACE so as to obtain (9).






















Using (5), equation (19) reduces to
￿ACE = ￿1￿CBIT (1 ￿ ￿CBIT)
￿1￿1 : (20)
Given (20), therefore, we can show that ￿ACE > ￿CBIT if ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿CBIT)
￿1￿1 >
1; and vice versa.
Let us next focus on the high-income ￿rm (with Y > Y ￿
CBIT). De￿ne NB
as the net bene￿t arising from investing in the ACE country. NB is given
by the di⁄erence between the post-tax NPV under the ACE regime and that
obtained under the CBIT one. Notice that, given inequality Y > Y ￿
CBIT, the
￿rm will immediately invest irrespective of the tax system. Thus, NB will
be
NB =
(1 ￿ ￿ACE)(Y ￿ rF)
r
￿
(1 ￿ ￿CBIT)Y ￿ rF
r
for Y > Y
￿
CBIT: (21)
12If ￿ACE > ￿CBIT (i.e. ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿CBIT)
￿1￿1 > 1); the level of current income









b Y ￿ Y
￿
;
with b Y ￿
￿1(1￿￿CBIT)￿1￿1
￿1(1￿￿CBIT)￿1￿1￿1rF > Y ￿
CBIT: This entails that NB is positive if
Y < b Y . This proves point i) of Proposition 2.
Let us next turn to point ii). If ￿ACE < ￿CBIT (i.e. ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿CBIT)
￿1￿1 <
1 ), it is straightforward to show that NB =
(￿CBIT￿￿ACE)Y +￿ACErF
r > 0
8Y > 0. This completes Proposition 2.￿
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